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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF DATA RETENTION
“Security, privacy and fundamental rights must be realized together and not at the  
cost of one another. That is the challenge.”1
1. Data  retention  can,  for  the  purpose  of  this  paper,  be  defined  as  “the  
obligation  put  on  the  providers  of  publicly  available  electronic  communications  
services or of public communications networks to retain traffic and location data as  
well  as  related  data  necessary  to  identify  the  subscriber  of  user  for  a  certain  
period”2.
Data retention, whenever used as a “necessary and effective investigative  
tool for law enforcement”3, will necessarily be an interference with the exercise 
of the right to respect for private life and correspondence as acknowledged 
* Frederik.Peeraer@student.ua.ac.be
1  S.  GUTWIRTH,  K.  DE VRIES and  R.  SAELENS,  “Veiligheid  legitimeert  niet  alle  middelen”, 
Juristenkrant 24 March 2010, 12.
2  Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Evaluation report from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Data Retention Directive 
(Directive  2006/24/EC),  31  May  2011,  consulted  via 
http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consulta-
tion/Opinions/2011/110530_Evaluation_Report_DRD_EN.pdf, lastly on 25 November 2011 
(hereafter: ‘Opinion EDPS 2011’), 4, nr.16.
3  Considerans 9, Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provi-
sion of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications 
networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC,  OJ L105, 13 April 2006, 54 (hereafter: ‘the 
Data Retention Directive’).
122 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 6:1
under article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (hereafter: 
‘EHCR’) and article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereafter: 
‘EUCFR’). This interference can be justified, according to article 8(2) ECHR 
and 52(1) EUCFR, if it is provided for by law, serves a legitimate aim and is  
deemed necessary in a democratic society.
The question arises how this interference can be correctly justified, and 
subsequently what a fair balance is between law enforcement and privacy 
and  how  this  balance  can  be  struck.  Of  course,  definite  and  absolute 
answers  are  not  to  be  strived  for:  instead,  I  will  investigate  the  actual 
approach in Belgium of these issues (including some critical remarks) and 
will try to see whether the balance mentioned above is struck.
Before  commencing  this  investigation,  a  closer  look  on  the  wider 
regulatory framework seems necessary.
1.2 THE DATA RETENTION DIRECTIVE
2. The most important element in the wider framework is undoubtedly the 
Data  Retention  Directive.  Apart  from  this  Directive,  being  very  rapidly 
elaborated4, the Directives 95/46/EC5 and 2002/58/EC6 need to be mentioned 
as well, as they still are very relevant for this matter.
The Data Retention Directive imposes the obligation for Member States 
to oblige network and service providers to retain certain data for a period 
between  6  and 24  months.  The  access  to  and use  of  these  data  by  law 
enforcement authorities, however intimately connected to the data retention 
itself,  has not been subjected to this (nor any other) Directive.7 The exact 
content of the Data Retention Directive will not be dealt with separately: the 
content  of  this  Directive  will  be briefly compared to the specific  Belgian 
approach when the scope of the latter is investigated.
1.3 (THE ABSENCE OF A) BELGIAN TRANSPOSITION
3. A single, complete and exhaustive law that transposes the Data Retention 
4  Bill modifying the articles 2, 126 and 145 of the Act of 13 June 2005 relative to electronic 
communications and the article 90decies of the Code of Criminal Procedure, version of 27 
August  2009,  consulted  via  http://stefaandeclerck.be/files/pdf/wet_dataretentie.pdf,  lastly 
on 25 November 2011 (hereafter: ‘Bill modifying diverse articles’), 14.
5  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, OJ L281, 23 November 1995, 31.
6  Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002  con-
cerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic com-
munications sector,  OJ L201, 31 July 2002, 37 as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, OJ L337, 18 December 2009, 
11.
7  See for a critical approach of the scope of the Directive: Opinion EDPS 2011, supra note 2, 6, 
nrs. 28-31.
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Directive has not been issued in Belgium. On the contrary, an amalgam of 
Acts and Royal Decrees has been issued in order to fulfill the transposition 
requirement.  However,  resistance  of  civil  society  organizations  has  been 
proved efficient to delay the transposition of some articles of the Directive 
in such a way that some of the transposing legal norms are not yet in force.8
4. As a result of the resistance and the choice of modifying existing Acts 
instead of creating new ones, the actual Belgian transposition is only partial 
and is scattered among diverse Acts and Royal Decrees, which complicates 
the general overview of the actual situation.
5. In the following part, the Belgian law will be analyzed both de lege lata 
(2) and de lege ferenda (3). In both parts the analysis will be conducted by a 
detailed investigation of the scope of the relevant legal norms.
2. THE BELGIAN APPROACH DE LEGE LATA
6. The actual Belgian situation concerning data retention will be examined 
in this chapter. Firstly, a general outline of the applicable norms concerning 
electronic  communication  and  privacy  will  be  given  (2.1).  Secondly,  the 
situations for the judicial (2.2) and the intelligence- and security services (2.3) 
will  be explained.9 Both will  be examined separately, since both types of 
services are governed by specific legal norms.
2.1 GENERAL OUTLINE
7.  The  general  Acts  concerning  the  processing  of  personal  data  and 
electronic communication are the Act  of  8  December 1992 relative to the 
protection  of  privacy  with  regard  to  the  processing  of  personal  data10 
(hereafter: ‘Privacy Act’) and the Act of 13 June 2005 concerning electronic 
communication11 (hereafter:  ‘AEC’).  Both  remain  applicable  to  data 
retention and have an impact on the way service providers are allowed to 
retain and process personal data. According to the  Privacy Act, each data 
8  E.g. propositions of future Acts and Royal Decrees that have been successfully impeded 
from coming in force: Bill modifying diverse articles, supra note 4; Draft of Royal Decree es-
tablishing the data to be stored in application of the article 126 of the Act of 13 June 2005, 
and the conditions and the duration of the storage of these data, version of 14 August 2009, 
consulted via http://stefaandeclerck.be/files/pdf/dataretentie_KB.pdf, lastly on 25 November 
2011 (hereafter: ‘Draft of Royal Decree’).
9  Except for these services, the Service for Mediation and emergency services also have ac-
cess to the retained data: see art. 43bis, §3, 7° of the Act of 21 March 1991 concerning the re-
form of certain economic public enterprises, BS 27 March 1993 and art. 107 AEC. It would 
go beyond the scope of this paper to discuss these services as well.
10  BS 13 March 1993. The Royal Decree of 13 February 2001 executing the Act of 8 December 
1992 relative to the protection of privacy with regard to the processing of personal data, BS 
13 March 2001 is also to be mentioned.
11  BS 20 May 2005.
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subject has, e.g. the right to access the data that have been processed.12
8. Common to both the judicial and intelligence services is the fact that 
there is  de lege lata no legal obligation for service providers to retain certain 
data for a certain period: the specific applicable norms13 only foresee in a 
possibility  for  judicial  and  intelligence  services  to  demand  certain  data, 
which the providers are obliged to communicate if  they have these data 
stored in their systems.14 The Royal Decree executing art.  126, §2 AEC –
which should provide a list of data to be retained and the duration of this  
retention- has never been issued.15
2.2 JUDICIAL SERVICES
2.2.1 SPECIFIC LEGAL NORMS
9. The competence for judicial services to require retained data from service 
providers has its legal basis in the articles 46bis and 88bis Code of Criminal 
Procedure (hereafter: ‘CCP’). The Royal Decree of 9 January 2003 contains 
some extra modalities concerning the legal obligation for services providers 
to cooperate.
10.  According to the first paragraph of the first mentioned article, the 
procureur du Roi (public prosecutor), when dealing with délits (misdemeanor 
of mediocre gravity) or crimes has the competence to require the cooperation 
12  Art. 10 Privacy Act. According to the current norms, the subscriber to a connection will 
have the possibility to control the communication behavior or –data from every user of that 
connection. The Privacy Commission considers this issue not being sufficiently dealt with: 
Commission for the Protection of Privacy, Advice concerning the Bill modifying art. 126 of 
the Act of 13 June 2005 relative to the electronic communication, and concerning the Draft of 
Royal Decree establishing the data to be stored in application of the article 126 of the Act of  
13 June 2005, and the conditions and the duration of the storage of these data (A/08/024), 2 
July  2008,  nr.  24/2008,consulted  via  http://www.privacycommission.be/nl/docs/Commis-
sion/2008/advies_24_2008.pdf, lastly on 25 November 2011 (hereafter: ‘Advice nr. 24/2008’), 
10, nr. 23.
13  Concerning the  judicial services, the articles 46bis, 88bis and 90quater, §2 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure (hereafter: ‘CCP’) and the Royal Decree of 9 January 2003 determining 
the modalities of the legal obligation to cooperate in case of judicial demands concerning 
electronic communications, BS 10 February 2003, as amended by the Royal Decree of 8 Feb-
ruary 2011, BS 10 February 2011 form the actual basis of this obligation to cooperate (here-
after: ‘Royal Decree 9 January 2003’); concerning the intelligence- and security services, fun-
damental legal norms are the Act of 30 November 1998 regulating the intelligence- and se-
curity services, BS 18 December 1998 (as amended by the Act of 4 February 2010 concerning 
the methods for gathering data by intelligence- and security services,  BS 10 March 2010) 
and the Royal Decree of 12 October 2010 determining the modalities of the legal obligation 
to cooperate in case of demands concerning electronic communications by the intelligence- 
and security services, BS 8 November 2010 (hereafter: ‘Royal Decree 12 October 2010’).
14  The service providers are obliged to erase these data or make these data anonymous from 
the moment they are not longer necessary for the transmission of communication: art. 122, 
§1 AEC. However, some exceptions are possible concerning invoices (art. 122, §2), market-
ing (art. 122, §3) and the investigation of fraud (art. 122, §4).
15  Response to the advice nr. 24/2008 of the Privacy Commission of 2 July 2008, Bill modifying 
diverse articles,  supra  note 4, consulted via http://stefaandeclerck.be/files/pdf/wet_datare-
tentie.pdf, lastly on 25 November 2011, 13-14 (hereafter: ‘Response to advice nr. 24/2008). 
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of  ‘operators  of  electronic  communication  networks’  and  ‘providers  of 
electronic  communication  services’16 in  order  to  identify  the  user  of  a 
service  of  electronic  communication  and  to  identify  these  services  of 
electronic  communications,  by  a  well-founded  and  written decision.  The 
motivation of the procureur has to reflect the proportionality respecting the 
privacy and subsidiarity in relation to any other act of research. In case of an 
‘extremely urgent necessity’, each officer of the judiciary police can, after 
the prior and oral consent of the  procureur, by a well-founded and written 
decision, demand these data. This officer communicates this well-founded 
and written decision and the obtained information to the  procureur in the 
following twenty-four hours and motivates the ‘extremely urgent necessity’.
11.  Art.  88bis CCP  allows  the  juge  d’instruction (the  examining 
magistrate) to demand the cooperation of the service provider in order to 
track the localization data and origin of destination of telecommunication. 
He  has  to  state  the  factual  circumstances  of  the  cases  which  justify  his 
demand  in  in a well-founded warrant that he  communicates  to the 
procureur.  The  procureur is  also competent to make a similar demand, but 
only in case of  flagrante delicto  and only for the punishable facts that are 
listed in  art.  90ter,  §§2,3 and 4 CCP.  If  he makes a similar  demand,  this 
demand  must  be  confirmed  within  twenty-four  hours  by  the  juge  
d’instruction.
12. In the Royal Decree of 9 January 2003, an institution called the “Cell 
of Coordination Justice” (hereafter: ‘CJ’) is being installed in each service 
provider.  This  Cell  consists  of  certain  persons  who  are  responsible  for 
handling the demands from the judicial services concerning the data that is 
being  retained  by  the  service  providers  they  work  for.17 This  Decree 
imposes  some  technical  obligations  on  the  service  providers,  e.g. the 
obligation  for  the  CJ  to  allow  the  NTSU-CTIF18 to  consult  the  client-
database19 and the obligation to “transmit [the data] in a safe way so the data 
16 The definition of ‘operator’ or ‘provider’ has been troublesome in practice: e.g. Yahoo! was 
judged not to be either an ‘operator’ nor ‘provider’ in the sense of this article. See Ghent 30 
June 2010, unpublished, consulted via
 http://www.legalworld.be/legalworld/uploadedFiles/Rechtspraak/De_Juristenkrant/YAHOO
%20Arrest%203 0%20juni%202010.pdf?LangType=2067, lastly on 25 November 2011. See for 
criticism  P.  VAN LINTHOUT,  “Yahoo  is  geen  verstrekker  van  elektronische 
communicatiedienst”, Juristenkrant 27 October 2010, 4-5.
    However, a recent arrest of the  Cour de Cassation  annulled this decision: Cass. 18 January 
2011,  P.10.1347.N,  unpublished,  consulted via  http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be,  lastly  on  25 
November 2011.
17 Art. 2, §1 Royal Decree 9 January 2003, supra note 13.
18 National Technical & Tactical Support Unit - Central Technical Interception Facility.
19 Art. 3, §2 Royal Decree 9 January 2003, supra note 13.
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will not be able to be intercepted by third parties”20 (emphasis added). The 
CJ will communicate the required data to the judicial services via a secured 
electronic pathway,21 which has to meet specified standards.22
2.2.2 ACTUAL PRACTICE
13. Despite  the  absence  of  an  obligation  to  retain  specific  data,  service 
providers do retain a serious amount of data and the judicial authorities 
already  demand  these  data.23 The  only  possible  consequence  judicial 
authorities  can  face,  is  that  previously  retained  data are  already  erased 
(according to the art. 122, §1 AEC).
The actual  situation already allows judicial  services to have access  to 
retained data. The articles 46bis and 88bis CCP (that provide this possibility) 
have  been  applicable  respectively  since  24  March  2007  (46bis)  and  10 
February 1998 (88bis). At the current stage, judicial services have access to 
certain data which are not mentioned in the Directive,24 due to the fact that 
service providers already retain them, even without a formal obligation to 
do so.
2.2.3 MEASURES TO COUNTERATTACK POSSIBLE ABUSE
14. As in any other constellation of legal norms, the risk of abuse of retained 
data by the judicial authorities is more than real: the articles 46bis and 88bis 
cannot prevent the fact that the procureur or the juge d’instruction are able to 
issue certain demands when the legal conditions are not met or other cases 
of possible abuse of these  data. Thus the questions rises how this can be 
avoided  (by  preventive  measures)  or  sanctioned  (by  reactive  measures) 
according to the applicable law.
A PREVENTIVE MEASURES
a) A supervising authority
15. Confining the  competence  to  the  CJ  to  refuse  manifestly ill-founded 
demands  is  not  possible  according  to  the  applicable  legal  norms25 and 
should not be a possibility according to me, since there is no possibility that 
the CJ will be aware of the exact content of the demand and the competence 
20  Art. 6, §1, 5° Royal Decree 9 January 2003, supra note 13.
21  Art. 10bis Royal Decree 9 January 2003, supra note 13.
22  Art. 6 Royal Decree 9 January 2003, supra note 13.
23  Response to advice nr. 24/2008, supra note 15, 27.
24  These  data  concern  (identification  of)  the  user  of  the  services:  Response  to  advice  nr. 
24/2008, supra note 15, 27.
25  Art. 46bis, §2, al. 4 and 88bis, §2, al. 3 CCP explicitly provide a penal sanction for refusal of 
cooperation.
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to refuse ill-founded demands can better be confined to an impartial judge. 
The  juge d’instruction fulfills this requirement, but it can hardly be argued 
that the procureur has a comparable level of impartiality.
b) A ‘safe way’ to access the data
16. According  to  art.  6,  §1,  5°  Royal  Decree  9  January  2003,  the  service 
providers must ensure a safe way for the transmission of data. Art. 2, §6 of  
the same Decree obliges service providers to take all necessary measures in 
order to guaranty the confidentiality of the information that is being used 
by  the  CJ.  In  this  way,  third parties  that  do  not  have to  competence  to 
require the stored data should not be able to obtain them.
B REACTIVE MEASURES
c) Supervising authorities
17. The Belgian Institute for the Post- and Telecommunication Sector (BIPT) 
is competent to control the respect for the AEC and its executing Decrees.26 
The BIPT has the competence to issue administrative fines, which can be up 
to  5%  of  the  turnover  (with  a  maximum  of  €12.500.000).27 Except  this 
institute,  the  Privacy  Commission,  the  manager  of  the  CJ  and  judicial 
services  can also  be mentioned as  supervision authorities  relative  to  the 
application of legal norms concerning data retention.28
d) Incriminations
i)Art. 39 Privacy Act
18. According to art. 39 Privacy Act, persons that breach art. 4 of the same 
act (e.g. by incompatible use of the data, storage of too many data…) can be 
given  a  fine  between  €100  and  €100.000.  As  well  as  the  control  of  the 
supervising authorities, this control mechanism is only indirectly useful for 
data retention.
ii)Art. 210bis, 458, 504quater, 550bis, §§1-2 of the Criminal Code.
19. These articles of the Criminal Code are phrased in a very general way 
and do not provide in a specific sanction for the breach of duties concerning 
data retention. Notwithstanding their general scope, they can still be very 
useful: e.g. art. 550bis, §§1-2 (which concerns internal and external hacking) 
26  Art. 14, 3° of the Act of 17 January 2003 concerning the statute of the regulator of the Bel-
gian post- and telecommunication sectors, BS 24 January 2003.
27  Art. 21 of the same Act.
28  Bill modifying diverse articles, supra note 4, 17, nr. 6.
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is applicable when unauthorized persons have had access to the data (§1) or 
when authorized persons have had access,  but have exceeded their legal 
competence (§2). The other articles refer to fraud involving informatics (art. 
210bis and 504quater) and the violation of professional secrecy29 (art. 458).
e) Possibility for service providers to complain
20. Demands from the judicial services are being dealt with by the NTSU-
CTIF unit of the federal police. This unit needs to have access to the client  
database of the service providers that have a ‘numberingcapacity’.30 Service 
providers can see when this unit has had unauthorized access and have the 
possibility to  address  this  issue.31 Since  they have to  give  an automated 
response  to  the  requests  made  by  the  NTSU-CTIF  unit,32 there  is  no 
possibility to refuse ill-founded demands.
2.2.4 CRITICAL APPROACH
A IN GENERAL
21.  Generally  speaking,  the  current  Belgian  approach  regarding  judicial 
services does not seem to be a justified interference with the right of privacy. 
In order for an interference to be justified, it has to be (1) provided by law, 
(2) striving for a legitimate aim and (3) necessary in a democratic society.
The  first  and second  condition  do  not  seem  to  pose  insurmountable 
problems concerning the Belgian situation33, but the third is problematic.
22.  A first  issue  concerning  the  question  of  necessity  is  whether  the 
imposed  measures  are  adequate  to  achieve  their  goal.  In  my  opinion, 
certainly  organized  crime  will  be  able  to  circumvent  most,  if  not  all, 
imposed measures: they will e.g.  know how to hide their IP-addresses or 
make  it  impossible  to  trace  their  calls.  According  to  me,  this  does  not 
automatically  imply  that  data  retention  is  not  necessary,  since  the 
circumvention  of  these  measures  requires  some  technical  skills  and  not 
29  Art. 46bis, §2, al. 3 and art. 88bis, §2, al. 2 impose a duty of secrecy to everybody who, in the 
execution of their function, comes in to contact with these data or cooperates in this proced-
ure.
30  Art. 3, §2 Royal Decree 9 January 2003, supra note 13.
31  Commission for the Protection of Privacy, Advice concerning the Bill and the Draft of Royal 
Decree relative to data retention, and the Draft of Royal Decree relative to the obligation to 
cooperate (A/09/012), 1 July 2009, nr.  20/2009, consulted via  http://www.privacycommis-
sion.be/nl/docs/Commission/2009/advies_20_2009.pdf,  lastly  on 25 November 2011 (here-
after: ‘Advice nr. 20/2009’), 14, nr. 43.
32  Art. 3, §2 Royal Decree 9 January 2003, supra note 13.
33  See however concerning the Data Retention Directive, Opinion EDPS 2011, supra note 2, 12-
14, nrs. 64-73 in which the Directive is being judged as not meeting the requirement of fore-
seeability.
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everybody that commits a ‘serious crime’ will possess that ability.
Apart  from this point,  conclusions can only be drawn very reticently 
from the gathered data and a cautious approach should be taken. How can 
we be sure that the person who is calling to X is really the person that is 
identified  by  the  service  provider  etc.?  The  adequacy  of  the  applicable 
norms can never be completely assured, but the usage of more data can 
offer a larger probability. In all, the issue of adequacy remains troublesome.
23.  Regarding  necessity  in  general,  the  legislator  has  tried  to  adopt 
measures that do not go further than necessary.34 Nonetheless, some doubts 
raise  whether  no  less  intrusive  techniques  could  have  been  used  and 
whether the right of privacy is in no way more infringed than absolutely 
necessary.  In  all,  this  attempt  to  balance  combined  with  the  following 
remarks do not make the actual interference justified in my opinion.
B REGARDING THE LEGAL NORMS THAT ALLOW ACCESS 
(ART. 46BIS AND 88BIS CCP)
24. The possibility for the procureur to demand retained data is quite limited, 
and therefore held proportional35: if the procureur wants to know to whom a 
certain phone number belongs, he can make a similar demand according to 
art.  46bis,  but  if  he  needs information concerning the persons who have 
been called from this number, the juge d’instruction has to make the demand 
according to art.  88bis.36 The organizational arguments and the restricted 
competence  for  the  procureur (i.e. that  the  intervention  of  the  juge  
d’instruction is required whenever a more invasive demand than the mere 
identification of a phone number is made) seem to be elements that provide 
a reasonable balance.
25.  However,  not  every  detail  in  these  articles  seems  to  be  as 
proportionate.  An  element  that  seems  disproportional  to  me  is  the 
possibility that the consent of the procureur has to be only oral in case of an 
‘extremely urgent necessity’: in modern times, requiring a written consent 
in each situation does not seem impracticable to me.37 But it is the absence 
of  a  clear  and effective  sanction for  abuses  of this  possibility  that  really 
34  See concerning art. 46bis and art. 88bis Exposure of Motives of Government bill 12 June 1997 
modifying the Act of 30 June 1994 concerning the protection of privacy against eavesdrop-
ping, taking note and registration of private communications and telecommunications, Par-
l.St. Senate 1996-97, nr. 1075/1, 1-7.
35  Exposure of Motifs of the Project of Act modifying article 46bis of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, Parl.St. Senate 2005-06, nr. 3-1824/1, 5.
36  Report 8 December 2006 in the name of the Commission of Justice by W. Muls of the Gov-
ernment bill modifying article 46bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  Parl.St. Chamber 
2006-07, nr. 51-2724/2, 6 (hereafter: ‘Report Muls’).
37  A similar remarks has been made by S. VERHERSTRAETEN: see Report Muls, supra note 36, 6.
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makes these articles disproportional to me.
26. The competence of the procureur to make these demands whenever he 
deals with ‘délits’ or crimes and the competence of the juge d’instruction to 
make these demands whenever he ‘judges that there are circumstances that 
make a detection of telecommunications or a location of the origin or destination of 
telecommunications necessary to unveil the truth’38 seem to be other problems.
27. The wide scopes of these articles will encompass a very large amount 
of incriminated behavior, and the question rises whether such a broad scope 
is justified. The Privacy Commission made the remark (concerning art. 46bis 
CCP) that this scope is too wide and that an exhaustive list of offences is to 
be preferred, by analogy of art. 90ter CCP concerning the tapping of private 
communication.39 The legislator disagreed, stating that it  is not doable to 
make  such  a  list,  that  guaranties  concerning  subsidiarity  and 
proportionality are already present and that the addition of new offences to 
the list  would be too time-consuming and difficult,40 so the very general 
description  of  ‘délits and crimes’ has  been maintained in  art.  46bis CCP. 
Recently,  the  European  Commission  stated  that  “[m]ost  transposing 
Member States, in accordance with their legislation, allow the access and 
use of retained data for purposes, going beyond those covered by the Directive,  
including  preventing  and  combating  crime  generally”41 (emphasis  added), 
thereby implying that ‘serious crime’ is more limited than the transposition 
of –at least some– Member States.
28.  In my opinion,  there is  no apparent  necessity for  the legislator to 
encompass  such  a  broad  specter  of  offences:  the  Directive  mentioned 
‘serious crime’ and it seems to me that (1) not every offence that falls under  
the scope of the mentioned articles is necessarily a ‘serious crime’42 and that 
(2) the importance of privacy prohibits such a more extensive interpretation 
of this term in national legislation. Moreover, the possibility is available to 
make this required exhaustive list: art. 90ter CCP already foresees in such a 
list,  so  why  would  this  be  impossible  in  relation  to  data  retention? 
According to me, lists of specific offences in both art. 46bis and art. 88bis 
CCP are essential elements in order to justify the serious interference with 
the right of privacy.
38  Art. 88bis, §1, al. 1 CCP.
39  Advice nr. 24/2008, supra note 12, 10-11, nrs. 25-26.
40  Bill modifying diverse articles, supra note 4, 14-15, nr. 5.
41  Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Evaluation re-
port on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), COM(2011) 225 Final, 8 (here-
after: ‘Evaluation Report’); Opinion EDPS 2011, supra note 2, 13, nr. 72.
42  In my opinion, art.  46bis and 88bis CCP are used for ‘preventing and combating crime 
generally’.
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C REGARDING THE MEASURES TO COUNTERATTACK 
POSSIBLE ABUSES
f) Supplementary incrimination
29. In order to comply with art. 13(2) of the Directive, a supplementary and 
specific  incrimination concerning abuse of retained data seems necessary. 
The legislator shared this opinion in the Bill  modifying diverse articles,43 
but since the Bill did not get adopted, a supplementary incrimination is yet 
to be issued.
g) Sanction for the usage of irregularly obtained data?
30.  Since the usage of irregularly obtained proof in criminal cases is being 
subjected to the so-called ‘Antigoon’ doctrine (which does not exclude ipso  
facto the usage  of these data) and privacy is severely compromised by the 
usage of retained data, a nullity sanction of the irregularly obtained data 
seems more than necessary.44 The argument of the legislator that it would 
‘not [be] logic’ to foresee in such a sanction in this Act45 is not compelling: 
the link between data retention and sanctions for irregularly obtained data 
is inherent to any norm regarding data retention, so that these sanctions can 
(and should) be provided by these norms.
h) ‘Safe access’
31.  Some  questions  can  arise  concerning  the  obligations  for  service 
providers to ensure the safe transmission of data.46 Is this the best way to 
ensure the safety of the data? I think there should be at least a thorough test 
to check whether the specific way of transmitting data is really secure, since 
–at this stage- the safety of the data is not properly ensured in my opinion.47
2.2.5 CONCLUSION CONCERNING THE JUDICIAL SERVICES
32. The adequacy of the usage of retained data seems to be a fundamental 
problem which can never be completely solved. The only way to cope with 
43  Supra note 4.
44  In the same sense: Order of Flemish Bar Councils,  Standpunt – Een kritische reflectie van de  
Europese  databewaringsrichtlijn,  consulted  via  http://bewaarjeprivacy.be/sites/www.bewaar-
jeprivacy.be/files/20091026_Standpunt_Orde_van_Vlaamse_Balies.pdf, lastly on 25 Novem-
ber 2011, 2.
45  Bill modifying diverse articles, supra note 4, 17, nr. 7.
46  See supra nr. 16.
47  See concerning general measures relative to the protection of processed data, Commission 
for  the  Protection  of  Privacy,  “Referentiemaatregelen  voor  de  beveiliging  van  elke  ver-
werking  van  persoonsgegevens”,  consulted  via 
http://www.privacycommission.be/nl/static/pdf/referenciemaatregelen-vs-01.pdf,  lastly  on 
25 November 2011.
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this  problematic  issue  is  to  refrain  from  reversing  the  presumption  of 
innocence  and  to  adopt  a  very  cautious  attitude  towards  drawing 
conclusions from the gathered ‘evidence’.
33.  Although  the  legislator  has  tried  to  strike  a  reasonable  balance 
between security issues and the right of privacy, the following elements still 
make the interference with the right of privacy unjustified:
- the consent of the procureur has to be only oral in case of an 
‘extremely urgent necessity’;
- a supplementary and specific incrimination concerning ab-
use of retained data is absent;
- a nullity sanction for irregularly obtained data is absent;
- the scope of art. 46bis and 88bis CCP is too wide;
- the safety of the data transmission is only to be dealt with 
by the service providers.
34. The common denominator in the first three remarks is the absence of 
an adequate and specific mechanism that supervises every element in the 
procedure  of gaining access  to  the retained data (and that  sanctions ad-
equately every abuse); the last two problems can only be solved by specific 
measures.
2.3 INTELLIGENCE - AND SECURITY SERVICES
2.3.1 SPECIFIC LEGAL NORMS
35.  As  mentioned  above,48 the  Act  of  30  November  1998  regulating 
intelligence- and security services49 and the Royal Decree of 12 October 2010 
determining the modalities of the legal obligation to cooperate in case of 
demands  concerning  electronic  communications  by  the  intelligence-  and 
security services50 form the fundamental norms regarding the possibility for 
intelligence- and security services. The Royal Decree of 12 October 2010 is 
almost identical to the amended Royal Decree of 9 January 200351, with the 
consequence that no further comment on this Decree will be made52, except 
for  the  obligation to preserve information concerning the identity of the 
48  Supra, note 13.
49  Ibid.
50  BS 8 November 2010. This Decree implements art. 18/7, 18/8, 18/17 and 18/18 of the previ-
ously mentioned law and art. 127, §1, al. 1, 2° AEC.
51  Supra, note 13.
52  See supra nrs. 12, 16 and 20 for comments on the (amended) Royal Decree of 9 January 2003, 
supra note 13.
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person that makes the demand for ten years.53 This obligation will provide a 
better way to remark and investigate possible abuses.54
36.  The articles 18/7 and 18/8 Act 30 November 1998 are the respective 
counterparts  of  the  articles  46bis and  88bis CCP.  The  content  of  these 
dispositions  are  identical,  except  for  the  subjects  that  are  competent  to 
demand certain retained data: where in art. 46bis the  procureur and in art. 
88bis the  juge d’instruction have this competence, the head of service has it 
according to art. 18/7 and 18/8.
37.  In the preparatory works of this Act,  the necessity to  balance the 
fundamental rights of individuals and the security of the State is one of the 
first topics mentioned.55 The professional secret needs to be treated with a 
specific  protection,  having  regard  to  its  specific  importance.56 Also,  the 
specificity of the intelligence- and security services are emphasized: these 
services  are  (to  a  certain extent)  not  comparable  to  the  judicial  services, 
since the former aim at an intellectual investigation of networks  that can 
pose a threat  to society,  while the latter  focus on the gathering of proof 
concerning offences.57
2.3.2 MEASURES TO COUNTERATTACK POSSIBLE ABUSE
A ABSENCE OF PREVENTIVE MEASURES
38.  No preventive  measures  are available  to  control  possible  abuses:  the 
supervising authorities will only have an a posteriori control. The legislator 
held  this  to  be  justified:  a  certain  flexibility  in  the  operations  of  the 
intelligence- and security services is  deemed to be necessary,  since a too 
demanding procedure would impede these services to work properly.58
B REACTIVE MEASURES
i) The administrative commission
39.  According  to  art.  43/1  Act  30  November  1998,  an  administrative 
53  Art. 3, §2, al. 3 Royal Decree 12 October 2010, supra note 13.
54  Commission for the Protection of Privacy, Advice relative to the Draft of Royal Decree de-
termining the modalities of the legal obligation to cooperate in case of demands concerning 
electronic  communications  by  the  intelligence-  and  security  services,  30  June  2010,  nr.  
23/2010, consulted via
   http://www.privacycommission.be/nl/docs/Commission/2010/advies_23_2010.pdf,  lastly  on 
25 November 2011, 3, nr. 9.
55  Private Member’s bill 10 December 2008 concerning the methods for the collection data by 
the  intelligence-  and security  services,  Parl.St. Senate  2008-09,  nr.  4-1053/1,  1  (hereafter: 
‘Private Member’s bill 10 December 2008’).
56  Ibid., 14-17.
57  Ibid., 12.
58  Private Member’s bill 10 December 2008, supra note 55, 26.
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commission is established in order to supervise the specific and exceptional 
methods for  the  gathering of data  by intelligence-  and security  services. 
Among the specific  methods, the demands of retained data are specified 
and mentioned,59 with the consequence that this commission  controls the 
gathering of these data as well.
The commission has different  competences  depending on the type of 
measure concerned: the commission will only have an  a posteriori control 
with it comes to these specific methods.60 At the end of each month, each 
service has to send detailed lists of the used specific methods, so that the 
commission could properly control the usage of these methods.61
j) The Fixed Comity I62
40.  According to  art.  43/2  Act  30  November 1998,  the  Fixed Comity I  is 
obliged to control  a posteriori the same specific  and exceptional  methods 
(and thus the relevant demands of retained data as well). This Fixed Comity 
I has, inter alia, the competence to judge the legality of the used methods, as 
well as the respect of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.63 It 
cannot only act motu proprio, but also (inter alia) on the request of the Privacy 
Commission or on the basis of a complaint.64
When  this  Comity  concludes  that  the  used  method  was  illegal,  the 
method has to be terminated and the acquired data must not be exploited 
and have to be destroyed.65
2.3.3 CRITICAL APPROACH
41. Does the criticism of the approach concerning the judicial services apply 
to these norms as well? Regarding the problematic issues of that approach66, 
the first four are not as troublesome.
42.  According to art. 18/7, §2 Act 30 November 1998, the officer of the 
intelligence  service  can  request  orally  the  concerned  data  in  case  of  an 
‘extremely urgent motivated necessity’, provided that he has the prior oral 
59  In art. 18/2, §1, 4°, the gathering of identification data of users of electronic communication 
is mentioned and in art. 18/2, §1, 5°, the research of call data and localization of origin or 
destination of electronic communication is notified.
60  Private Member’s bill 10 December 2008, supra note 55, 26. Concerning exceptional methods, 
it will have to give its prior consent.
61  Ibid.
62  The Fixed Comity on the Supervision of Intelligence Services.
63  Art. 43/2, al. 2 Act 30 November 1998, supra note 13.
64  Art. 43/4, 1st-3rd bar Act 30 November 1998, supra note 13.
65  Art. 43/6, §1, al. 1. Act 30 November 1998, supra note 13.
66  See supra nr. 33.
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consent of the head of service. The head of service will confirm as soon as 
possible this oral consent by a written and motivated decision. Contrary to 
the situation of the judicial services, a specific authority supervises every 
decision  in  relation  to  specific  methods.  By  installing  this  specific 
administrative commission, a fair balance has been struck in this situation 
according to me.
43.  The second (concerning a supplementary incrimination)  and third 
remark (concerning the nullity sanction for irregularly obtained data) are 
not  applicable  either,  due  to  the  presence  of  the  same commission.  The 
supplementary  incrimination  and  the  nullity  sanction  for  irregularly 
obtained data are deemed necessary in the situation of the judicial services 
because of the absence of adequate control mechanisms; since a specific and 
adequate administrative commission is present, these two problems seem to 
be solved as well.
44.  The fourth remark, regarding the scope of art. 46bis and 88bis CCP, 
does  not  apply  here.  The  competence  of  the  head  of  service  to  make 
requests concerning retained data ‘whenever this is of importance for the 
execution  of  the  missions’67 can  be  justified  by  referring  to  the  specific 
mission of the intelligence- and security services.
45. The only remark that is also applicable on the access of intelligence- 
and  security  services  is  the  last  one  (regarding  the  safety  of  the  data 
transmission). According to art. 8, §1, 5° Royal Decree 12 October 2010, the 
service provider must ensure a safe way for the transmission of data. Again, 
a  specific  test  to  check  whether  the  specific  way of  transmitting data  is 
really secure seems to be necessary.
2.3.4 CONCLUSION CONCERNING THE INTELLIGENCE- AND 
SECURITY SERVICES
46.  Contrary to the legal norms governing the judicial services, the norms 
that  are  applicable  to  the  intelligence-  and security  services  seem rather 
proportionate to me,  provided that  the same cautious approach is  taken 
whenever conclusions are drawn from the gathered data.
Apart from the omnipresent issue of adequacy, a supplementary safety-
check of the way providers transmit data seems to be to only issue.
2.4 CONCLUSION CONCERNING THE BELGIAN APPROACH 
DE LEGA LATA
47. The actual situation in Belgium concerning data retention is fragmented 
67  Art. 18/7, §1 and 18/8, §1 Act 30 November 1998, supra note 13.
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and complex, since no general and systematic implementation of  the Data 
Retention Directive has been issued.
Notwithstanding the absence of any obligation for service providers to 
retain  certain  data,  the  actual  practice  is  that  judicial-,  intelligence-  and 
security services demand the necessary data from these providers. Due to 
the  absence  of  such  an  obligation,  these  services  will  sometimes  be 
confronted with the fact that the requested data have been erased according 
to the Act on Electronic Communication.
48. In my opinion, the present situation concerning judicial services does 
not  provide  the  required  guarantees  in  order  to  achieve  the  necessary 
balance between the need for judicial services to use this data and the right 
of privacy. An independent authority should be installed in order to deal 
with  possible  problems concerning the  oral  consent  of  the  procureur,  the 
absence of a specific incrimination and the absence of a nullity sanction for 
irregularly  obtained  data;  the  scope  of  the  relevant  articles  should  be 
narrowed, a limitative list of ‘serious crimes’ should be established and a 
thorough test should be provided to check whether the data transmission 
mechanisms used by the service providers are sufficient.
49.  On the contrary, the situation concerning intelligence- and security 
services offers guarantees to  deal with possible abuses in an effective way 
so  that  it  seems  rather  proportionate  (except  maybe  for  the  data 
transmission mechanisms).
50. The most problematic point concerning the present situation is that 
the above-mentioned services have far greater competences when it comes 
to access of retained data than is being realized. At this moment, only other 
(even more) invasive measures are not getting agreed upon following the 
parliamentary procedure.68 However, at  this moment, numerous types of 
data  are  being  retained  by  the  providers69 and  are  accessible  for  these 
services, with the consequence that the disperse and unclear regulation of 
data retention in Belgium is more privacy-invasive than it appears to be on 
first sight.
3. THE BELGIAN APPROACH DE LEGE FERENDA
51. In this chapter, the Bill modifying diverse articles and the Draft of Royal 
Decree70 will  be  examined,  since  the  legislator  tried  to  transpose  the 
Directive by using these two instruments.
68  See infra nrs. 51-58.
69  See Response to advice nr. 24/2008, supra note 15, 27.
70  See supra note 8 for their complete titles.
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Firstly, the goal of these legal norms will be examined (3.1); secondly, an 
analysis will be made of the data that are to be retained according to the 
Royal Decree (3.2). Thirdly, the duration of the obligation to retain will be 
dealt  with  (3.3).  Fourthly,  the  supplementary  measures  to  cope  with 
possible abuses are being discussed (3.4). Fifthly, an general evaluation will 
be made of these propositions (3.5). Finally, an overall view of the future of 
data retention in Belgium will be made (3.6).
3.1 THE GOAL OF THE PROPOSITIONS
52.  The  goal  of  the  above-mentioned  norms is  wider  than the  research, 
prosecution and repression of criminal infractions (which constitute serious 
criminality).  Repression  of  malicious  calls  to  emergency  services  and 
research by the Mediation service for telecommunication of the identity of 
persons  having  made  malicious  use  of  an  electronic  communication 
network  or  service  are  other  goals,71 but  the  repression  of  serious 
criminality remains the most important one. The Privacy Commission has 
(correctly) made some critical  remarks concerning these other two goals: 
since  their  access  to  retained  data  is  based  on  other  purposes  than the 
investigation of criminal infractions, other conditions for their access should 
be  required  and even better  would  be  that  their  access  is  dealt  with  in 
separate legislation.72
3.2 WHAT DATA ARE TO BE RETAINED?
53.  According to the Draft of Royal Decree, the data listed in the Directive 
do not suffice,73 since the necessities of the police services require a more 
extensive list.74
The justification of the supplementary identification data is that (1) it is 
necessary for the identification of users of communication services and (2) 
these  data  only  relate  to  the  user  and  not  to  the  traffic  data  (and  are 
therefore proportional).75
Except these identification data, some traffic data are also concerned:
- personal data (delivery- and invoice addresses);
- payment data (type of payment, identification of the mean of pay-
ment, data and time of payment);
71  Art. 3, §1, al. 3 Bill modifying diverse articles, supra note 4, 34-35.
72  Advice nr. 24/2008, supra note 12, 13, nr. 30.
73  Report  to  the  King  of  the  Draft  of  Royal  Decree,  supra note  8,  http://stefaandecler-
ck.be/files/pdf/ dataretentie_KB.pdf, lastly on 25 November 2011, 1.
74  Response to advice nr. 24/2008, supra note 15, 25-26.
75  Ibid., 26-27.
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- technical data relative to the creation of an account on an internet 
service (IP-address, network connection point);
- information concerning the transfer of a phone number.76
54.  Questions arise concerning the  necessity to extend the list  of data 
provided by the Directive. The usefulness of these supplementary data is 
clear, but does it outweigh the supplementary infringement of the right of 
privacy? In my opinion, a detailed and specific impact assessment is not 
doable  in  this  case,  so  that  the  given  justifications  of  this  extension  can 
appear reasonable,  provided that  an evaluation of the necessity of  these 
supplementary data will take place not long after these legal norms are in 
force.77 According to the Bill modifying diverse articles, such an evaluation 
will take place two years after the Royal Decree would have come in force.78
3.3 HOW LONG MUST THE DATA BE RETAINED?
55.  Originally, the legislator intended to insert a duration of 24 months.79 
After critical remarks from the Privacy Commission80, the legislator reduced 
the duration to 12 months, with an exception for exceptional circumstances 
which can justify a duration longer than 12 months.81 If the duration would 
exceed 24 months, the other Member States and the European Commission 
will be informed. If the Commission does not decide within a period of six 
months after the notification, the prolongation will be deemed approved.82
56.  In the actual situation, these durations seem too long. According to 
information  from  the  federal  judicial  police  of  2007,83 only  15%  of  all 
requests relate to data less than six months old, 51% relates to data between 
six and twelve months old and 34% is older than twelve months. However, 
these data seem to be somewhat contradicted by the Evaluation Report of 
the European Commission. This report shows that 86% of all requests relate 
to data less than six months old, 12% relate to data between six and twelve 
months old and only 2% relate to data that are older than one year.84
At this stage, a thorough reevaluation of the appropriate duration has to 
take place before continuing the parliamentary procedure concerning the 
76  Ibid., 28-30. For each of these traffic data, a specific justification is listed.
77  In the same sense: Advice nr. 20/2009, supra note 31, 14, nr. 14.
78  Art. 3, §4 of the Bill modifying diverse articles, supra note 4, 36. 
79  Advice nr. 24/2008, supra note 12, 13, nr. 33.
80  Ibid., 13-15, nrs. 33-36.
81  Art. 3, §1, al. 4 and §2, al. 1 of the Bill modifying diverse articles, supra note 4, 35.
82  Art. 3, §2, al. 2-3 of the Bill modifying diverse articles, supra note 4, 35-36.
83  Response to advice nr. 24/2008, supra note 15, 32.
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Draft of Royal Decree.
3.4 WHAT SUPPLEMENTARY MEASURES TO COPE WITH 
ABUSES ARE PROVIDED?
57.  After  having read the  remarks  of  the  Privacy Commission  that  a 
supplementary incrimination should be provided,85 the legislator adapted 
his  Bill  modifying  diverse  article  in  order  to  install  this  extra 
incrimination.86 Apart from this (useful and necessary) extra incrimination, 
no further measures are taken by the Bill and the Draft Royal Decree.
58. Still, a specific authority should supervise every usage or decision in 
relation to usage of retained data. The BIPT87 and the Privacy Commission 
are  useful  supervising  authorities,  but  they  are  not  sufficient  to 
counterbalance the possible abuse of oral consents of the procureur nor the 
absence of a nullity sanction for irregularly obtained data.
3.5 GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSITIONS
3.5.1 THE CHOICE FOR A ROYAL DECREE
59.  There has been quite a discussion about the use of a Royal Decree to 
transpose  some very  essential  norms:  the  legislator  argued that  a  Royal 
Decree is (1) necessary for a ‘quick update’ and is (2) not contrary to the will  
of the legislator;88 the Order of Flemish Bar Councils emphasizes the fact 
that the usage of a Royal Decree is ‘unacceptable’ since crucial elements will 
not  be  subjected  to  a  ‘thorough and ample  parliamentary  debate’;89 the 
Privacy  Commission  found  the  choice  for  a  Royal  Decree  ‘difficult to 
reconcile’ with choices made in the Directive.90 In my opinion, the usage of a 
Royal Decree should be avoided: for me, the necessity for a ‘quick update’ 
does not outweigh the need for an (at least possibly) thorough debate.
84  Report Comm. 18 April 2011 from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment, Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), COM(2011) 
225 Final, 22. Since the goal of the Directive is to harmonize the national legislations (art. 1 
Directive), a period of six months seems more appropriate if, after a serious impact assess-
ment, the legislator is of the opinion that the Directive should still be transposed.
85  Advice nr. 24/2008, supra note 12, 23, nr. 65.
86  Art. 4 of the Bill modifying diverse articles, supra note 4, 37.
87  See supra nr. 17.
88  Exposure of  Motives  of  the  Bill  modifying diverse  articles,  supra note  4,  consulted via 
http://stefaandeclerck.be/files/pdf/wet_dataretentie.pdf,  4  and  Response  to  advice  nr. 
24/2008, supra note 15, 19.
89  Order of Flemish Bar Councils, Standpunt – Een kritische reflectie van de Europese databewar-
ingsrichtlijn,  consulted  via 
http://bewaarjeprivacy.be/sites/www.bewaarjeprivacy.be/files/20091026_Standpunt_Orde_v
an_Vlaamse_Balies.pdf, 2.
90  Advice nr. 24/2008, supra note 12, 13, nr. 32.
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3.5.2 NECESSITY OF PROPOSITIONS IS NOT 
DEMONSTRATED
60.  The  issue  of  necessity  has  not  been  sufficiently  dealt  with  in  the 
underlying prepositions.  Firstly,  the above-mentioned91 issues concerning 
the adequacy reappear and secondly, no demonstration of the necessity of 
these propositions has been made.
At  first,  the  propositions  were  not  conclusive  concerning  their  own 
necessity;92 afterwards,  the  Privacy  Commission  correctly  raised  the 
question  why  the  existing  norms  do  not  suffice.93 The  response  of  the 
legislator94 was, in my opinion, completely insufficient, due to the following 
three factors:
- no quantitative nor qualitative  statistical information has been used, 
although the actual  practice concerning the existing norms (46bis 
and 88bis CCP) could provide the required data to make an impact 
assessment;
- no reference to the possibility of data preservation95 has been made, 
nor has it been considered as an (at least partial) alternative for data 
retention:  the only alternative considered was the interception of 
the content of electronic communication;
- no balance between the right of privacy and the usefulness of these 
data  for  the  authorities  has  been  made:  only  the  fact  that  some 
crimes cannot be solved without data retention was mentioned.96
 3.6 CONCLUSION CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF DATA 
RETENTION IN BELGIUM
61. At this moment, the deadline foreseen for the approval of both the Bill 
modifying diverse  articles  and the Draft  Royal Decree has  not  been met 
“due to the collapse of the government”.97 In general, the resistance of civil 
society organizations has proved to be efficient to prevent the Bill and Draft 
Royal Decree of coming in force, but maybe even more important is  the 
situation on the European level.
91  See supra, nr. 22.
92  Advice nr. 24/2008, supra note 12, 7, nr. 16.
93  Ibid.
94  Response to advice nr. 24/2008, supra note 15, 10.
95  Of course, data preservation will not help to solve every crime, but at least a thorough ana-
lysis of its use should have been made. In the same sense (concerning the Directive): Opin-
ion EDPS 2011, supra note 2, 10-11, nrs. 53-57.
96  Response to advice nr. 24/2008, supra note 15, 10-11.
97 Statement  made  on  the  website  of  Minister  of  Justice,  Stefaan  De  Clerck: 
http://www.stefaandeclerck.be/nl/dataretentie/941.
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In its report, the Commission acknowledges that the current approach of 
data retention needs to be revised.98 In order to do so, the Commission will 
execute  an  impact  assessment,  so  that  further  practical  evidence  can  be 
gathered  in  order  to  demonstrate  the  necessity  of  European  measures 
concerning data retention.99 This  impact assessment should also examine 
whether other, less privacy-intrusive measures can be appropriate,100 but as 
a consequence the future of data retention on a European level is uncertain:  
it  may  well  be  the  conclusion  of  the  impact  assessment  that  other,  less 
intrusive means than data retention can be used to achieve the same goal.
62. In this European perspective, the future of data retention in Belgium 
seems  highly  uncertain  as  well.  If  the  resistance  from  civil  society 
organizations already prevented a complete and full  transposition of the 
Directive,  chances  are  minimal  that  the above-mentioned Bill  and  Draft 
Royal Decree will be approved having regard to the current insecure future 
of the European approach.
4. GENERAL CONCLUSION
63. Seeing the chances of having a complete transposition being minimized 
does however not imply that an imminent danger has been avoided: in the 
second chapter, it has been argued that the actual situation of data retention 
in Belgium is more privacy-intrusive than it appears to be on first sight.101
64. The absence of any future measures will have the negative effect that 
a thorough and broad assessment of the actual situation will probably not 
be a political priority. Nonetheless, it has been argued that the applicable 
legal  norms  regarding  the  judicial  services  should  be  seriously  revised, 
since  the  Belgian  approach  at  this  moment  does  not  seem  to  meet  the 
requirements concerning data protection and privacy.102
65.  In  all,  as  for  the  European  level,103 all  possibilities  should  be 
considered and a serious and ample debate about data retention in Belgium 
should be a political priority, having regard to the severe infringement of 
the right of privacy, even by the norms that are currently applicable.
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